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rrIB SUPREJYIE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

· PHILLIPS AND
UBY PHILLIPS

Plaintiff - Appellants
vs.

CASE NO. 12740

OELE CITY CORPORATION

Defendant-Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

----------------

ATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE C!ISE

Appellants brought this action for damages
ainst the respondent for the amount of $2,413. 91
edicated upon the respondent's agents negligence
a collision, occurring in Tooele City, State
Utah, on December 18, 1970.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

This matter was tried to a jury on September
1971, and judgment of non-suit was entered.
-1-

the respondent 1 s motion to dismiss after
1

I

I

sppellants had rested the.ir case in chief.

The

Judge Gordon P. Hall having directed a
judgment in favor of the respondent on the
grounds of contributory negligence.
SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants request this court to set aside
this judgment of non-suit.

I

!STATEMENT OF FACTS
Phyllis Utahna

was driving the appe-

lants Ford, Maverick west on Utah Avenue in the
proximity of its intersection with 5th Street
December 18, 1970 (T-4 ) •
covered with snow

The road was completely

(T36-L28)

and as driver approach

ed 5th Street she observed respondents garbage
Truck (T-4

L-23)

stopped to the north of the

curb line facing south.

Mrs. Perkins proceeded

believing that the garbage truck had
Yielded the right-of-way and when she was over

-2-

way through the intersection in the northI

111est quarter of the intersection, respondents
I

driver of the garbage truck having failed
to look to the left before entering the inter-

section (T-38) and drove the garbage truck into
right front quarter of the appellants vehicle.
The point of impact being approximately 24 inches

behind the right front headlight (T-24).

The

accident occurring in the north-west quarter
corner of the intersection (T-17

)•

The force o:

the garbage truck colliding with appellants
rehicle pushed appellants vehicle into the
south-west quarter corner of the intersection
( T-17).

The impact causing damages to the

appellants vehicle in the amount of $ 2,413. 91
which included front fender, grill, headlight,

.bent hood, upper railing of the front sub-frame,
connecting brace on the fire wall, a cross to
the sub-frame, shock tower, superficial sldn
damage, tires, (T-25).

Substantially causing

a total loss damage to appellants vehicle

-3-

'i·1ich was seven months old at the time

espondent broadsided appellants vehicle.
There was no damage sustained by the
respondent.
Mrs. Perkins is appellant's Ruby Phillips
daughter and was age 16 at the time of the
collision and was married at the time appellant
Phillips had signed the drivers license
application ( T-13).

Appellants Luke Phillips

had purchased the Maverick on May 27, 1970.

He was not the father of Mrs. Perkins (

)

he had not signed the drivers license applica-

tion ( T-13 ) and had not given Mrs. Perldns
permission to drive the vehicle.

( T-43 ).

ARGUMENT
Point

1

THE SUPREME COURT, IN REVIEWING THE
JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE, MUST VIEW THE
EVIDENCE IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO
THE APPELLANT.

Point 1
In cases such as the instant appeal wherein

re trial Judge entered judgment of non-suit

ron the close of the Plaintiff 1 s case, the
have uniformly held that in reviewing a

I

of non-suit the evidence must be viewed
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a
most fo.vorable to the plaintiff.

LQ.nion Pac. Railroad

I

RaymEnd

113, U. 26, 191 P. 2d

Knox v. Snow, 119 U. 522, 229 P 2d

7

4 (1951)
In Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.

I

(1952) the Court stated:
In appraising the dismissal which was
granted against plaintiff, he is entitled
to have us review all of the evidence,
together with every logical inference
which may fairly be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to him.

I

Following this established principal, the Utah
I

urt in Mal storm v. Olsen, 16 Utah 2d 316,
2d 209-,-r1965) said:

I

I

I...._

We reverse non-suit judgments if there is
a reasonable basis in the evidence and the
inferences therefrom when considered in a

-5-

most favorable to the losing
party (plaintiff) for a judgment in
her favor.
We submit in view of the foregoing, that
I

this Court must view the evidence in this appeal

in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs and
must engage in all inferences which may be drawn

fiom the evidence in favor of the Plaintiffs

and

must engage in all inferences which may be drawn

the evidence in favor of the plaintiffs.

POINT 11
T}ill TRIAL JUDGE MISINTERPRETED THE
TESTIMONY OF DRIVER OF APPELLANT'S

VEHICLE.

Announcing the decision of Defendant's
to Dismiss, Judge Hall stated:
The Court cannot disregard the
direct testimony of Mrs. Perkins
which indicates that she did observe
the truck some two hundred to two
hundred fifty feet away, that's the
note that I had. And then did not
see the vehicle again until the
collision, which in the Court's
view would deem her to be guilty of
contributory negligence."
11

No where in the direct testimony of Mrs.
did the witness ever state that she

-6-

observed the truck some two hundred to two
hundred and fifty feet away.

The Testimony

the witness revealed the following facts
as to her viewing the garbage truck.

lifuen

what she observed the witness answered:
A.

(T 4-L 22) On Utah Avenue, and I seen the
garbage truck, but I seen that it was
stopped.

Q.

Where did you see the garbage truck?

A,

On 5th Street

Q.

And on which side of the street?

A,

The right.
On cross examination the witness stated:
(T-15 L-3) I see the truck.
back further, but I seen that
and I was going slow enough.
to go through and after I got
was, he came out and •••

I seen it
it was stopped
I proceeded
past where he

Q,

How far back would you say you were when
you saw the truck •••• how far bac·k from
the east side of this intersection (L 9-10)

A,

(T-15 L-15) About a half a block.
On redirect, the witness was asked: (T-20

L-11) •

-7-

Do you know how long those blocks are?
I don't know how long they are.
You know how many houses would be on a block?
Four
, Only four houses to each block?
Yes

1

Then it's your testimony then that when you
first saw the truck you were about two houses
back from the corner.
Yes
Testimony which the Trial Jude;e relied
upon wets not the direct testimony of the
witness, M:rs. Perkins, but was from the
testimony of Howard E. Cooper, on cross
examination by the Defendants Counsel,
(T-36-L-13) I asked her how far back she
was. She indicated a point back in the
road.which I estimated, around two hundred
to two hundred fifty feet.
Thus, the Courts opinion was based upon the

stimate of the witness and not upon the drivers

estimony.

Judge Hall also erred in concluding

hat the witness's testimony was that she "did
see the vehicle again until the collision."
Examination of the Transcript of the cross

Kamination of this witness indicates that the

Jnclusion of the Trial Judge was talrnn from the

-8-

direct question of the Respondent's Attorney,

qhich was a compound question as follows:

1

Q,

O.K. About a half a block, and your prior
testimony wa,s i think, if I recall it

correctly, was that you saw the
that position and that you then
on and you didn't see it again,
wasn't aware of it until it was
street in front of you, is that
(T-15)

truck in
continued
or didn 1 t out in the
correct?

Obviously the witness could not have answered
accurately the question proponded, and parts of
the

answer were clearified by the following:

(T-16 L-2)
Q,

O.K. and then you ,iust continued on. The
next time you observed it, when it was in
front of you, when it collided?

A,

When it was at the side of me.
The Driver further testified on Cross

Examination (T-18 L-14)
Well, did you see it, and what it did?

A,

I seen it come out and hit me, but it just
come all of a sudden.
This testimony is substantiated by the

ntness, Doyle Roy Rolley, a passenger in the

-9-

ssenger vehicle, who reported his observations
follO\'lS:
0h, well, we Nas just e;oing down that
one road and then we were almost in the
middle of the inGersection and the
garbage truck came out of the side and
I shut my eyes that's all. (T-41 L-2)
11

Concluding that the driver of the Plaintiff's
hicle did not see the garbage truck again until
e collision, the Court erred in his decision

at the driver was guilty of contributory
glic:;ence as a matter of law.
Justice Crockett, in analyzing the observations
cessary in approaching an intersection in the
inion of Martin v. Stevens...?

121 Utah 484, 496,

3 P. 2d 747, (1952), stated:
He must remember that there were three
other streets to give some attention to
as he approached the intersection. All
of the attention could not very well or
safely be focused on any one at any
given instant.

In this case, the driver of the Plaintiff's
observed the Defendant's garbage truck
north of the Intersection, at a point
is North of a dip or extension of the
utter across the road way running parallel

o the Avenue upon Which the plaintiff• s vehicle
as

travelling.

Having observed the truck

it became the duty of the driver of
aintif'f 's automobile to divide her attention
the possible traf'f'ic from the left and
raight ahead.
The question Of observation of the driver
1

the Plaintiff S Vehicle, having Observed the

ck stopped, and presumed that the defendant's

had yielded at the entry into the larger
ue from the intersecting street, ltms necessarily
sect also upon the snow covered, slick surface

he road way of Utah Avenue.

The Court, in the above cited case of Martin
tevens

in asserting that such evidence should

ighed by the Jury also called attention to
of proximate cause as a Jury question.
we assume that all reasonable men
must conclude that plaintiff's failure to

keep more of a .lookout to the east amounted

would they also all agree
t
'nat such
w
,
•
tel y
failure
to observe proxima

caused the collision?

-11--:__ _ _ __

Apparently the Trial Juuge heard certain
idence, which he believed to have been from
edirect testimony of the plaintiff's witness,
ght men were impannelled to hear the facts

tnis matter, and among these Jurors, a. misterpretation of the testimony could have been
earified by discussion.

That the function

the Jury is to be the trier of the facts, is
t

dioputed, and hppellantc having estublishcd

prima. facia case of nee;ligence against the
iver of the Defendant's vehicle, and no
vidence having been disputed that the Driver of
arbage truck was the servant of the defendant,
nd that he was at the time and place of said

ccident, acting within the scope of his employment,
aid negligence of the employee was imputed to the

mployer, Tooele City Corporation, a.nd the
'.ppellants were entitled to have the burden of
rooving contributory negligence rest upon the
Defendant

'

and then submitted to the Jury for

deliberation.
-12-

POINT III
IBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS AN ISSUE TO
TERMINED BY THE JURY AS THE TRIER OF
iling opinion of the Surpreme Court of the

of Utah as to the issue of contributory

is set forth in Hughes v. Hooper, 19

W 389, 431 P. 2d 983 (1967) an action which
an open intersection collision.
t

The

therein stated:
The

right::; and duties of dr:Lvcrs approa.-·hinr;

intcrsl!cttons arc qu.cr,tion::; dcnlinr·; with

Lhe otandard of conduct to be expected
a reasonably prudent man and are peculiarly
a matter for the jury. Contributory negl:i.gence is therefore preimarily to be resolved
by the trier of the facts since it involve;;
these same rights and duties. It is not to
be treated as one of law unless the facts
and inferences from them are free from doubt.
If there is doubt, the issue is for the jury.
mi th

y_. Thorton, 23 Utah 2d 110, 458 P. 2d 870,

the Court reversed a directed verdict in
rof the defendants entered upon the ground
11

the plaintiff was guilty of contributory

igence as a matter of law."
Court therein stated:
The defendant has the burden of proving that
the plaintiff • • • was negligent and that
his nealigence was the proximate cause or
his injuries. Both of these issues must be
proven by a preponderance of the

if there is any reasonable
basis in the evidence, or from lack of
evidence, upon which jurors could reasonably remain inconvinced on either issue
the court is not justified in taking
case from the jury.
instant matter, the Court entered the
owing findj_ngs of fact

//4.

As the driver of Plaintiff's vehicle was
approaching the intersection of 5th street
and Utah Avenue, approximately 200 to 250 ·eet
or one half block from said intersection, 3aid
driver observed the Defendont' s garbac;e tru '.:
stopped at the north edGe of said
with the left side of said vehicle near the
center of 5th street, nnd thnt sa:ld driver
did not observe said truck thereafter until
just as it pulled out into the intersection
in front of her and that she had no opportunity to apply her bra·.kes prior to said
collision and that there were no other
vehicles on the roadway nor any other obstructions of her vision of said truck from the
time she first saw it until the collision.

ording to the findings above quoted, the jury
d reasonably

find that Defendant's driver had

red his right to the right of way by stopping
llie entrance to the open intersection, and having
his right had no right to enter the intersecfrom a stopped position without ascertaining

traffic was approaching from the drivers
t, and that the acts of the defendant's driver

ethe sole proximate cause of the collision.

above findings of fact were erroneous,
as the evidence offered by all of the
sses, including the investigating officer,
snowed that the Defendant's vehicle struc:c
of the car owned by Plaintiff; s and that
faint of impact was to the rear of the right
twheel of the Plaintiff's vehicle, and therethe finding that driver of Plaintiff's autole did not see the truck
ed

11

until just as it

out into the intersection in front of hcr 11

ot in compliance with any evidence, includ 1ng

l

evidence offered in the
In Hindmarsh V.O.P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21

G, 446

P. 2d

410,

(

) the court said:

The burden of proving contributory negliBence
is upon the defendant. The trial court
properly teke the issue from the jury and rule
that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of loaw only if the
demonstrated that fact with sufficient 2ertainty that all reasonable minds would so find.
Conversely, if the evidence is such as to
permit reasonable minds to differ as to whether
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence, the question is for the jury ·
to decide.
Under a fact situation similar to the instant
er, the Court in Williams v. Zions Cooperative

-15-

r

wt:iJe Institution, 6 Utah 2d
283, 312 P.
1r, (1957) stated that the 11 plaintiff was
lfJY through the intersection she was
truck. The front end of defendant 1 r
,struck the car driven by plaintiff on the
and near the car 1 s center • • • on
efacts the court held plaintiff contributorily
11
igent as a matter of law.
rsing the decision of the lower Court and
Court stated:

A fact question was presented as to whether
entered the intersection when plaintiCf
or if defendant entered the
when plaintiff was appronchine so closely on
'throuc;h highway as to com>titutc an immediate
rd. 'l'he further fact question was presented a:'
hether de fend ant had entered the intersect ion
r such circumstances as to impose on plaintifC
duly tO yielding the right of way.
Those are proper jury questions and should
been submitted.
In the instant matter, the questions
uld properly have been submitted to the jury were:

1.

If the defendant 1 s driver had the right

my pursuant to Utah Code Anno. (1953) 41-6-72(b)
llie defendant's driver waive the favored position
driver approaching an intersection from the
when the said driver was stopped at the intertion?

2.

Was the proximate cause of the accident

failure of the Defendant's driver to look to

l

he

left before entering the intersection

r having been stopped a_t the entrance thereto.

3,

At

what point did Plaintiff's driver

•ally observe the defendants truck stopped?
ebeing two discriptions of the distance,
being 200 to 250 feet testified to by the

icer, the other being in the middle of the bl'.) :k
ch

block consisted of only four residential

!ding lots, placing the driver of Plaintiff'' s

oobilc approximately 150 feet east of the
rsection.

4.

Does the driver of an automobile have

duty to continue to observe the actions of a
rer who has apparently yielded the right of

,or must the attention of the driver then focus
left before entering the intersection to
ITtain whether traffic is approaching from
t direction?

5.

Does Utah Avenue, being a wider avenue,

W feet in width, than the intersecting street
Street, and the construction of the
ie

roads, Utah Avenue being constructed without

-17-

dWS

or gutters crossing the payment from
to Broadway; 5th street having a dip

utter area crossing the payment necessitatj_ng
approaching Utah Avenue from the North,
before entering the larger Avenue, transfer
right of way to the traveler on the through
et, even in the absence of regulatory divices

ommonly used: ie, signs or semaphores?
Utah Code J\nno. ( 1953)
provides:
(2) The driver of a vehi6le shall stop as
required by this act at the entrance to a
through highway and shall yield the right
of way to other vehicles which have entered
the Lntersection from said through highway
or which are approaching so closely on said
hishway as to constitute an immediate
hazard. • •
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise
stop in obedience to a stop sign as required
herein at an intersection where a stop sj_gn
is erected. • •
A clear reading of the Act indicates that

Legislative intent is to provide for through
nnay traffic without each intersection being

with a stop sign or other regulatory divices.
The use of dips or of 11 bumps u across the pave,; of roads being effectively employed for the
of curtailing the movement of traffic
of signs.

6.

Was the Plaintiff's vehicle actually

ithin the intersection at the time the Defendant's
ehicle approached and entered the intersection.
In Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P. 2d

(1955)

the Court stated.

Plaintiff not only entered the intersection
irst, he had nearly passed over it before the
efendant entered. Plaintiff was the disfavored
river until he had entered the intersection at
time when no car traveling the through highway
the intersection or was approaching so
losely on said through highway as to constitute
immediate hazard. But ha vine; entered as authoized, he became the favored driver and all other
hlcles approaching the intersection on said throu,'.3h
'ghway were obliged to yield the right of way to
In the above cited case the driver of a pick
ptruck was not held contributorily negligent
here the facts showed that the disfavored driver
ntering the intersection from the left of the
efendants truck, did not observe the defendants
ruck again until immediately before the defendant s

ruck collided with the side of Plaintiff's vehicle.
Under the holdings of the Supreme Court of
he

State of Utah, the issue of Contributory

egligence was certainly an issue for the jury.
As stated in Martin y_. Stevens, 121 Utah 48!.1.,
P2nd

747

, (1952) 489.

The question of contributoy negligence is
I

lusuallY for the jury and the court should be relunc1

itant
I

:

to take consideration of this question of fact

, 115 Utah 68, 202 P.
'
!2d547, Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

:from it. Nielson v.

•121 Utah 37, 37, 239 P. 2d 163.

The expressions

lthose cases are in accord with this uniformly accep-

'ted doctrine.
•be safeguarded.

The right to trial by jury should
Before the issue of contributory

lnegligence may be talrnn from the jury, the der:'end-

•

tants'

burden of proving both (a) that plaintiff'

i was gull ty of contributory negligence proximately
r

contributed to cause his own injury, must be met,
and established with such certainty that reasonable

t

minds could not find to the contrary, conversely,

•if there
i'

is any reasonable basis, either because
of evidence, or from the evidence and the

'fair inferences arising therefrom, taken in the

•1 light

most favorable to plaintiff, upon which

f reasonable
I

I

l
I

minds may conclude that they are not

convinced by a preponderance of the evidence

either (a) or (b) that such negligence proximately
contributed to cause the injury, the plaintiff
-20-

;ntitled to have the question submitted to
J.rY.
POINT IV
OWNER OJ:t 1-1 VJ::i;HlCLJ:; W.1:-lICl-i IS DAivi.ll.GED BY 11'1-iE
AC'l'S Ob' 'l'WO NEGLlGJ::i;N'l DRLV.!:!:RS M.AY
DV]!;K .HIS DAMAGES l1'.t\01v1 KL'l'.l:ili.l:{ O.H. BO'l'.l:i SUC.!:i
LlGEN'l' .. P.KKSONS.
1

1

In Caperon y_. Tuttle, 100 Utah 476, 116 P.

(1941) the Court stated:
The cases are numerous which had that i
uries result from a collision, the proximate
ses of which are the concurring, negligent
the driver nnd a 3rd person, recovery may be
d against either or both of such negligent
sons. (citations omitted)
r>

The holding of the

above was also

lied in the case of Dawson v. Board of Ed0.· a0

nof
·, (

Weber County, State of Utah, 222 P. 2nd
) , wherein the Court said:

Having a single cause of action against more

n one tort feasor, an injured party may proceed

.inst the wrong doers either jointly or severally
.he may recover judgment' or judgments against
1or all, but he can have put one satisfaction
the cause of action • • •
This rule was applied as the law of Utah in
ilOth Circuit, Court,

States v. First

l:!!ity B8nk, 208 F 2d 424, (1953):
-21-

negligence of one per8on cannot be

by
concurr·Lng negligence
c-1110 Gner.
H;1e .CE: several causes

producing an injury are concurrent and
each is an efficient proximate
without which the injury would not have
occurred, the injury may be attributed
to all or any of the causes ••• If the
acts constituted negligence both Vernon
and Mardis were responsible, and the
plaintiffs could proceed aeainst one or
both of them. McKenna v. Scott 10 Cir.,
202 F 2d 23, McClave v. Moulton 10 Cir., 123 F
450. This is-:rrle rule in '(ff;Q"'h-;
The rule has been lone established in this
___
_ _ _ _'l'ransi
______
_ _ _ _ '.if2_
Lsdiction, in Jack.son v.
Utah
t __
Compuny

Utah 21, 290 P. 970 (1930) the Court found that
was immaterial, so far as the Plaintiff was
cer:ned if the driver of the Plaintiffs
was negligent in any act of driving,
negligence of the driver could not prevent
I Plaintiff from recovering from the defendant.

Relative to the above issues is the

l•tion:

, May a joint owner of a vehicle recover loss

hained to his vehicle from a collision in which

joint owner and a third person are contributorily ,

-22-

Hgent?
From the discussion above, it is clear that
owner, or an injured party not the driver of a
dcle involved in a collision, may recover from
:her of two wrong doers.

The issue of Joint

of a vehicle does not create a different
.e when the j:>int owner is not present in the

iOmobile at the time of the collision.
In Conklin et al v. Walsh et al, 113 Utah
>, 193 P. 2d Ji.37, ( 194e)

An action by Clifford E. Conklin ••• to rerover
for damages to named plaintiff's automooile
resulting from a collision with the defendants
company's truck, wherein the defendant filed
a cross complaint. Judgment from the named
plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
Judgment affirmed.

In this action Mrs. Conklin was driving the
automobile and the husband recovered the
punt or' damages, which constituted the deductible
rtion of an automobile collision insurance policy,

brn the defendants who were guilty of contributory
in an intersection collision with the
vehicle which Plaintiffs wife was
I

'iving e

.

I
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The Court stated: There is no presumption
of agency between husband and wife in the
operation of an automobile merely because
of
relationship has been fully
decided by i.,nis court in the case of Fox v.
Lavender, b9 Utah 115, 56 P. 2d 104b.
A distinction has been made by the Court in

tions invo1 ving the joint ownership of vehic:1es
which the joint owners are both present in the
tomobile at the time of a collision.

This rule

d distinction drawn therefrom with the above

se is best summarized by the 10th Circuit case
W. W. Clyde & Comp

y_. Dyes, 126 F 2d r(23,

follows:
It is the law in Utah that
joint
of an automobile are traveling together in it
at the time of an accident with resultine;
injury or damage, it will be presumed that
they have joint right of control and therefore that the driver is operating it on
behalf of himself and the other present
owner or owners. Fox v. Lavender 89 U 115,
56 P 2d 1049; Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah
401, 62 P. 2d 1-17.
.

The Court, however did not follow the abo.ve
rule as it stated:
Under the agreed facts the status of
Plaintiff ( wi!'e) was tnat of guest or
invitee without Voice or control over
the automobile. Jaclrnon v. Utah Rapid
Transit Co. 77 U. 21, 290 P. 970.
v-:--smith 81 U. 179, 17 P 2d 224, Caperon v.
Tuttle 100 U 476. 116 P 2d 402 "{1941)
-24-

If Mrs. Perkins

was c ontribu-corily negligence,

,actions cannot bar the recovery of the
from the Defendant.
POIN'l' v:
41-2-10 CANNOT
U.r'
M.LNUR 'l'U 'l'rt.t<.; UWN.t;.K .LllJ AN ACT.LON
)UGli'l' BY 'l'Iili OWNB.K
AN ALLEG_ti;D
llill PAl\'l'Y.
In

u.c.A. 41-2-10 (b) states as follows: Any
negligence or willful misconduct of a minor
under the age of' eighteen years when drivin8
a motor vehicle upon a highway shall be
imputed to the person who has signed the
application of such minor for a permit or
license, such minor for anY-_ dama!.Ses caused
£L_ such negligence or willfull miscondu;'t.
As we have previously explored, a husband
1

not stopped from collecting damages from one or
joint tort feasors where his wife is contri-

rtorily negligent

in the distruction of his, or

Beir property.

Utah law prohibits a spouse from suit against
spouse in Tort.

Therefore a spouse suff-

ring damages which are concurrently cuased from

he joint acts of the spouse and a tnird person,
ioes not possess the right to bring an action

either of the wrongdoers, and in order to

-25-

I

I

· 1

:over for damages not caused by his
;t pursue his remedy against tne third party.

If the contributory negligence of the minor
!er the age of lb, is imputed to the person who

'

the drivers license, then in the instant
;e the co-plaintiff Luke Phillips would have
3

right to recover from the negligent driver of

s vehicle, were it not for the imputed negligence
virture of the statute,

the joint tort-

asor liable to the Plaintiff his spouse.
There have been no Utah cases in point
is issue, Prosser 3rd Sec 73 states:

The result at which the courts have arrived
is that the plaintiff will never be barred
from recovery by the negligence of a 3rd person unless the relation between them is
that tne plaintiff would be vicariously liable as a defendant to another who might be
in,iured.
Appellant Luke Phillips could not have been
lld liable under the provisions of

U. C.A.

l953) for any negligent act of the driver Phillls
Gahna Perkins, had her negligence caused any
amage to the Defendants garbage truck.

It

that if he could not have been held liable
a defendant, then his recovery as a plaintiff

-26-

,uld not be denied.
The Main·e .c;upreme Co u rt in
· ___£rt_
y 1 v. Day 1 s Inc .
2d 730, Maine,

l

(1958)

had an oppor-

1itY to examine into the extension of imputed

of a minor driver.

The Supreme Court

W that a statute providing that every owner
motor vehicle permitting a minor under lb years
age to operate it upon a highway shall be
intly and severally liable with such minor
r ony darnaGes caused by

of minor,

:d not preclude the owner of a motor vehicle wh'.J
Id permitted a minor under the age of 18 years to

ierate it upon a highway from recovering damac;es
a

third party, who with the minor

pintly caused the damage to the owners vehicle.
therein stated:
The notable words of the act, of primary

ment here are: "Shall be jointly and severally

with such minor for any damages caused
the negligence of such minor in operating
ch veilicle. 11

f

l

11

The phrase, ''liable with such minor,
ccepted for the familar and commonplace langua0e
hkh it is connotes a
responsibility and
ccountabili ty of the bailer with the bailee to

I

-21-

Jrd persons.

It hss never been customary or
to
to a person as being
.able -c,o nimselJ. in expounding that he cannot re1ver r·rom others for his damages out must defrev
.s otm losses • • . . The expression "any
ii
•
•
J
•
'
lUSB d ,
is
very inc
_usive
but pertains
to dama_ges
1third parties rather than to the bailor or his
wttel if read within their context. Had the
1gisla ture in reality addressed its thought and
rrorts to imputing contributory negligence to the
the appropriate wording would have been
forthcoming.
Re!ering to the Restatement of Torts the Maine wrt quoced the following:.

In the Restatement of the Law, Torts, Negligence
485 we find:

Comment on Caveat: 11
A statute may make the O\lmer of an a.utomo'le liable for any harm done to others by the
nner j_n which it is driven by any person whom
e owner permits to drive it. The Caveat leaves
ffi the question whether the effect of such a
atute is to create a universally applicable
icarious responsibility and, therefore, to make
neGligence of such bailee a bar to recovery
ly the owner for harm t.o him or the car. The
is one of statutory construction, if
e purpose of the statute is to give to persons
.jured by the negligent operation of automobiles
approximate certainty of an effective recovery
nwlr:ing the ree;istered
wl:o
to
ke out insurance to cover his
or wno
ls Hkcly to do so, responsible as well as the
ossible_-'_ or p-robable irresponsible person t·rhom
he owner permits to drive car, the statute_does
ot make the drivers contributory negligence a
artoEll.eovffierFsrecovery for harm done to the
11
. ar by the negligence of a third person.

i

f
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This question has been also considered
the Superior Court of Delaware, in Westergren

1y

King_, 99 A 2d 356 (1953)
the Court's opinion state:

Our statute is silent with respect to the
of the negligence of the minor to
m ovme::c who sues a third person to recover
sustained by the owner as a result of
1collision due to the third person's
the question is presented: Does the statute
the owner of an automobile liable for the
egligence of a minor driving the automobile for
is own purposes and with the consent of the
1mer impute the minor's contributory negligen.:e
the owner where the owner sues a negligent
third person to recover damages sustained by
In other words, does the language employed
only mo.k.e the owner liable to third persons
ror the minor's
but, also, at the
'arae tirne,, preclude the owner i'rom recoverinc;
negligent third persons where the re'overing against negligent third persons where
the minor has been guilty of contributory negli.

!

Concluding that the contributory negligen:e

Pf a minor could not be imputed to the owner of
automobile to bar the owners recovery from
parties, the Court Stated:

In my opinion the provisions
72
hrive not altered or chanced in any J.ash1on the
Coinmon law rule respecting an owner 1 s right to
[:covery from a negligent third
under
such as disclosed in -che present
1
The imputation of a
s
e
to an owner under this statute is applicable

-29-

mlY in actions brought by a third person
ovmer. The statute cannot be
1g8iost
lnvoked cor the purpose of imputing the
negligence of the minor to the
hmer in an action brought by the ovmer
1gainst an alleged negligent third party.
A fortiori, In the instant matter, the
jefendant' s suffered no physical damage to
I

Garbage Truck, they did not file a claim
damages and did not counterclaim in the

Ire sent

suit.

CONCLUSION
Appellants submlt thFLt the issue of
I

iontributory Negligence of the driver of the
flaintiffs vehicle should have been a ,jury
I

fuestion; that regardless of the contributory
egligence of a non-owner driver, the owner has
, right to recovery from either negligent party
'

I

joint tortfeasors, That Utah Law specifically
upheld a Plaintiffs claims against a negligent

lhlrd party for damages sustained by Plainti fl'
I

bthe
I

result of concurring acts of negligence
part of the Plaintiff's spouse and a

lhird party where such spouse-Plaintiff is not

-30-

in the automobile; that recovery

lad been denied to a joint-owner spouse by the
ltah Courts only where both husband and wife
rere in the accident; that the statutory im.putof liability of a person who signs the
'

license for a minor under the age of

f8,

is not applicable to bar an owner for re-

jovery of their damages from third persons
I

I

negligence; that this court should

ropt the view set forth by the Maine and

elaware Courts and adopted by the Restatement
f Torto.

Respectfully submitted:

MYRNA MAE NEBEKER
212 Phillips Petroleum. Bldg.
Salt La·ke City, Utah 84101
Attorney for PlaintiffsRespondents
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